This paper introduces generalized potential functions of complete information games and studies the robustness of sets of equilibria to incomplete information.
Introduction
Outcomes of a game with common knowledge of payoffs may be very different from outcomes of the game with a "small" departure from common knowledge, as demonstrated by Rubinstein (1989) and Carlsson and van Damme (1993) . This observation lead Kajii and Morris (1997a) to study what equilibria of complete information games are not much affected by weakening of the assumption of common knowledge; they studied the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information. An equilibrium of a complete information game is robust if every incomplete information game with payoffs almost always given by the complete information game has an equilibrium which generates behavior close to the equilibrium. Kajii and Morris (1997b) demonstrated that robustness can be seen as a very strong refinement of Nash equilibria. The refinements literature examines what happens to a given Nash equilibrium in perturbed version of the complete information game. A weak class of refinements requires only that the Nash equilibrium continues to be equilibrium in some nearby perturbed game. The notion of perfect equilibria by Selten (1975) is the leading example of this class. A stronger class requires that the Nash equilibrium continues to be played in all perturbed nearby games. The notion of stable equilibria by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) or that of strictly perfect equilibria by Okada (1981) are leading examples of this class. Robustness belongs to the latter, stronger class of refinements. Moreover, robustness to incomplete information allows an extremely rich set of perturbed games. In particular, while Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) allowed only independent action trembles across players, the definition of robustness leads to highly correlated trembles and thus an even stronger refinement. Indeed, Kajii and Morris (1997a) constructed an example in the spirit of Rubinstein (1989) to show that even a game with a unique Nash equilibrium, which is strict, may fail to have any robust equilibrium. Kajii and Morris (1997a) and Ui (2001) provided sufficient conditions for the robustness of equilibria. Kajii and Morris (1997a) introduced the concept of p -dominance where p = (p 1 , . . . , p n ) is a vector of probabilities. An action profile is a p -dominant equilibrium if each player's action is a best response whenever he assigns probability at least p i to his opponents choosing actions according to the action profile. Kajii and Morris (1997a) showed that a p -dominant equilibrium with P i p i < 1 is robust. Ui (2001) considered robust equilibria of potential games, a class of complete information games possessing potential functions. As considered by Monderer and Shapley (1996) , a potential function is a function on the action space such that it incorporates information about players' preferences over the action space that is sufficient to determine all the equilibria. Ui (2001) showed that the action profile that uniquely maximizes a potential function is robust.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a new sufficient condition for the robustness.
The condition unifies and generalizes the sufficient conditions provided by Kajii and Morris (1997a) and Ui (2001) . 1 Furthermore, the condition applies not only to the robustness of equilibria but also the robustness of sets of equilibria. This paper introduces generalized potential functions and provides the condition in terms of argmax sets of generalized potential functions.
We start by defining the robustness concept as a set valued one, 2 the robustness of sets of equilibria to incomplete information. A set of equilibria of a complete information game is robust if every incomplete information game with payoffs almost always given by the complete information game has an equilibrium which generates behavior close to some equilibrium in the set. If a robust set is a singleton then the equilibrium is robust in the sense of Morris (1997a, 1997b) . Because some games have no robust equilibria, it is natural to ask if a set of equilibria is robust.
We then introduce generalized potential functions. A generalized potential function is a function on a covering of the action space, a collection of subsets of the action space such that the union of the subsets is the action space. It incorporates some information about players' preferences over the collection of subsets. We call each element of the domain of a generalized potential function an action subspace. If an action subspace maximizes a generalized potential function and the generalized potential function has a unique maximum then we call the action subspace a generalized potential maximizer (GP-maximizer).
The main results state that there exists a correlated equilibrium assigning probability 1 to a GP-maximizer and that the set of such correlated equilibria is robust. This 1 This unification of conditions based on potential arguments and conditions based on p-dominance may be of interest in other contexts. For example, potential arguments are widely used in evolutionary contexts and Sandholm (2001) has a p-dominance sufficient condition for almost global convergence. 2 Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) were the first to propose making sets of equilibria the objects of a theory of equilibrium refinements.
immediately implies that if a GP-maximizer consists of one action profile then the action profile is a robust equilibrium. It should be noted that a robust set induced by the GPmaximizer condition is not always minimal. A robust set is minimal if no robust set is a proper subset of the robust set. In this paper, we do not explore the problem of how to identify minimal robust sets.
It is not so straightforward to find GP-maximizers from the definition. One reason is that, as we will see later, a complete information game may have multiple generalized potential functions with different domains. We restrict attention to generalized potential functions with two special classes of domains. One class of domains are unordered partitions of action spaces. We introduce best-response potential functions as functions over the partitions such that the best response correspondence of the function defined over the partition coincides with that of a complete information game. Potential functions of Monderer and Shapley (1996) form a special class of best-response potential functions with the finest partitions. 3 We show that a best-response potential function is a generalized potential function. The other class of domains are those induced by ordered partitions of action spaces. We introduce monotone potential functions as functions over the partitions such that the best response correspondence of the function defined over the partition and that of a complete information game has some monotonic relationship with respect to the order relation of the partition. We show that a monotone potential function naturally induces a generalized potential function where the domain consists of intervals of the ordered partition. We then show that a p-dominant equilibrium with P i p i < 1 is the induced GP-maximizer, by which the discussion of Kajii and Morris (1997a) and that of Ui (2001) are unified. Rosenthal (1973) was the first to use potential functions in noncooperative game theory. 4 He used potential functions as tools for finding pure-action Nash equilibria. 5 Recent studies such as Blume (1993 Blume ( , 1997 , Ui (1997 Ui ( , 2001 , and Hofbauer and Sorger 3 Morris and Ui (2002) demonstrated that the class of best-response potential functions with the finest partitions are much larger than the class of potential functions. 4 In cooperative game theory, Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) introduced potential functions. The potential functions of Monderer and Shapley (1996) can be regarded as an extension of the potential functions of Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) to noncooperative games, as demonstrated by Ui (2000) . 5 In traffic network theory, non-atomic games similar to the finite games of Rosenthal (1973) are studied and non-atomic potential functions are used to calculate pure-action Nash equilibria. See Oppenheim (1995), for example.
(1999) used potential functions as tools for finding Nash equilibria satisfying some criteria for equilibrium selection. Since a narrow class of games admit potential functions, attempts have been made to introduce tools for a broader class of games. Monderer and Shapley (1996) introduced ordinal potential functions 6 and generalized ordinal potential functions. Voorneveld (2000) introduced best-response potential functions, 7 which are different from best-response potential functions in this paper. These functions inherit ordinal aspects of potential functions and serve as tools for the former use (finding pureaction equilibria). They are in clear contrast to generalized potential functions in this paper, which serve as tools for the latter use (refining equilibria).
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 defines robust sets of equilibria.
Section 3 introduces generalized potential functions. Section 4 provides the main results.
Section 5 discusses best-response potential functions and Section 6 discusses monotone potential functions. Section 7 concludes the paper.
Robust Sets
A complete information game consists of a finite set of players N , a finite action set A i for i ∈ N , and a payoff function g i : A → R for i ∈ N where A = Q i∈N A i . We write A −i = Q j6 =i A j and a −i = (a j ) j6 =i ∈ A −i . We also write, for S ∈ 2 N , A S = Q i∈S A i and a S = (a i ) i∈S ∈ A S . Because we will fix N and A throughout the paper, we simply denote a complete information game by g = (g i ) i∈N .
An action distribution µ ∈ ∆(A) is a correlated equilibrium of g if, for each i ∈ N ,
for all a i , a 0 i ∈ A i . 8 An action distribution µ ∈ ∆(A) is a Nash equilibrium of g if it is a correlated equilibrium and, for all a ∈ A, µ(a) = Q i∈N µ i (a i ) where µ i ∈ ∆(A i ). We also say that a ∈ A is a Nash equilibrium if µ ∈ ∆(A) with µ(a) = 1 is a Nash equilibrium.
Consider an incomplete information game with the set of players N and the action space A. Let T i be a countable set of types of player i ∈ N . The state space is 6 See also Kukushkin (1999) . 7 Ui (1997) considered similar functions in the context of stochastic evolutionary games. 8 For any finite or countable set S, ∆(S) denotes the set of all probability distributions on S.
the prior probability distribution on T with
Because we will fix T , N , and A throughout the paper, we simply denote an incomplete information game by (u, P ) where u = (u i ) i∈N .
A (mixed) strategy of player i ∈ N is a mapping σ i : T i → ∆(A i ). We write Σ i for the set of strategies of player i. The strategy space is Σ = Q i∈N Σ i . We write
We call σ P an action distribution generated by σ.
A strategy profile σ ∈ Σ is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of (u,
for all t i ∈ T i and a 0 i ∈ A i where
be the payoff of strategy profile σ ∈ Σ to player i ∈ N . Then, σ ∈ Σ is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of (u, P ) if and only if, for each i ∈ N ,
For given g, consider the following subset of T i :
i is realized, payoffs of player i are given by g i and he knows his payoffs. We write
Payoffs of a 0-elaboration are given by g with probability 1 and every player knows his payoffs. It is straightforward to see that if a 0-elaboration has a Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ ∈ Σ then an action distribution generated by σ, σ P ∈ ∆(A), is a correlated equilibrium of g. Kajii and Morris (1997a, Corollary 3.5) showed the following property of ε-elaborations, which we will use later.
is an ε k -elaboration of g and ε k → 0 as k → ∞. Let σ k be a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of (u k , P k ) and let σ k P be an action distribution generated by σ k . Then {σ k P } ∞ k=1 has a subsequence which converges to some correlated equilibrium of g.
We say that a set of correlated equilibria of g is robust if, for small ε > 0, every ε-elaboration of g has a Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ ∈ Σ such that σ P ∈ ∆(A) is close to some equilibrium in the set.
Definition 2 A set of correlated equilibria of g, E ⊆ ∆(A), is robust to all elaborations in g if, for every δ > 0, there existsε > 0 such that, for all ε ≤ε, every ε-elaboration of g has a Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ ∈ Σ such that max a∈A |µ(a) − σ P (a)| ≤ δ for some
If E is a singleton then the equilibrium in E is robust in the sense of Kajii and Morris (1997a).
Kajii and Morris (1997b) considered a weaker version of the robustness of equilibria than that of Kajii and Morris (1997a) . 9 We consider the corresponding version of the robustness of sets of equilibria. A type t i ∈ T i \T u i i is committed if player i of this type has a strictly dominant action a
Definition 3 A set of correlated equilibria of g, E ⊆ ∆(A), is robust to canonical elaborations in g if, for every δ > 0, there existsε > 0 such that, for all ε ≤ε, every canonical ε-elaboration of g has a Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ ∈ Σ such that
If E is a singleton then the equilibrium in E is robust in the sense of Kajii and Morris (1997b) .
In Section 4, we will provide two sufficient conditions for the robustness of sets of equilibria, one for the robustness to all elaborations and the other for the robustness to canonical elaborations respectively.
For either of the robustness concepts, if E is robust then a set of correlated equilibria E 0 with E ⊆ E 0 is also robust. A robust set E is minimal if no robust set is a proper subset of E. In this paper, we do not explore the problem of how to identify minimal robust sets. 9 The difference between them is an open question.
Generalized Potentials
Monderer and Shapley (1996) defined weighted potential functions of complete information games.
Definition 4 A function f : A → R is a weighted potential function of g if there exists
for all i ∈ N , a i , a 0 i ∈ A i , and a −i ∈ A −i . A complete information game g is a weighted potential game if it has a weighted potential function. When w i = 1 for i ∈ N , we call f a potential function and g a potential game.
Suppose that g has a weighted potential function f . Then
for all i ∈ N and λ i ∈ ∆(A −i ). We generalize (2) to define generalized potential functions. 10 Before providing a formal definition, we present an example. Let The function F has the following property: for Λ i ∈ ∆(A j ) and λ i ∈ ∆(A j ) with
where i 6 = j. As we will see later, F is a generalized potential function of g.
To provide the formal definition, we first introduce the domain of a generalized po-
That is, A i is a collection of nonempty subsets of A i such that S
Note that A and A −i are coverings of A and A −i respectively. We call X ∈ A an action subspace.
We then introduce, for
Imagine that player i believes that a −i ∈ A −i is chosen in two steps:
, and then, a −i ∈ X −i is chosen according to some λ
such that X i is maximal in the argmax set ordered by the set inclusion relation. An action
It is clear that F : A → R in the above example is a generalized potential function
At the extreme, consider F : A → R such that A i = {A i } for all i ∈ N . Note that A = {A}. Clearly, every complete information game has a generalized potential function of this type. At the other extreme, consider F :
A weighted potential game has a generalized potential function of this type, which we prove in Section 5.
Lemma 2 If g is a weighted potential game with a weighted potential function f then g has a generalized potential function F :
Before closing this section, we give a characterization of
This lemma is an immediate consequence of the result of Strassen (1964) , which is well known in the study of Dempster-Shafer theory. 11 Dempster-Shafer theory considers non-additive probability functions called belief functions. Every Λ i ∈ ∆(A −i ), called a basic probability assignment, defines a corresponding belief function v
It is known that the correspondence between Λ i and v Λ i i is one-toone. An additive probability function λ i ∈ ∆(A −i ) is said to be compatible with a belief function v
11 Dempster (1967 Dempster ( , 1968 and Shafer (1976) .
for all B −i ∈ 2 A −i . 12 Strassen (1964) proved that, for all
, which is exactly Lemma 3.
Main Results
Suppose that g has a generalized potential function F : A → R with a GP-maximizer X * . Let E X * be the set of correlated equilibria of g that assign probability 1 to X * :
Our main results state that E X * is nonempty and robust. We present two theorems below. In Theorem 1, we consider all generalized potential functions and provide a sufficient condition for the robustness to canonical elaborations. In Theorem 2, we consider a special class of generalized potential functions such that A i ∈ A i for all i ∈ N and provide a sufficient condition for the robustness to all elaborations.
Theorem 1 If g has a generalized potential function F :
A → R with a GP-maximizer X * , then E X * is nonempty and robust to canonical elaborations in g.
Theorem 2
If g has a generalized potential function F : A → R with a GP-maximizer X * such that A i ∈ A i for all i ∈ N , then E X * is nonempty and robust to all elaborations in g.
If E X * is a singleton, then it is a minimal robust set and the equilibrium in E X * is robust in the sense of Morris (1997a, 1997b) . Clearly, if a GP-maximizer consists of one action profile, then E X * is a singleton. It is straightforward to see that E X * of the example in the previous section is also a singleton where the GP-maximizer consists of four action profiles.
It should be noted that E X * is not always a minimal robust set. For example, if a generalized potential function is such that A i = {A i } for all i ∈ N , then E X * is the set of all correlated equilibria. 13 The above theorems are useful only when we have nontrivial generalized potential functions. 12 In literature of non-additive probabilities written by economists, λi is called a core of v
is a core when we regard B −i ∈ 2 A −i as a coalition. 13 Kajii and Morris (1997a) remarked the robustness of the set of all correlated equilibria.
In the remainder of this section, we prove Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 simultaneously.
The proof is presented in four steps.
For the first step, let (u, P ) be an ε-elaboration of g and consider collections of
where we say that a i ∈ A i is an undominated action of type t i if it is not a strictly dominated action of type t i . We say that a i ∈ A i is a strictly dominated action of type
Note that Ξ is nonempty if and only if, for all i ∈ N and t i ∈ T i \T u i i , there exists X i ∈ A i such that X i contains every undominated action of type t i . As considered in Theorem 1, if (u, P ) is canonical and player i of type
i has a strictly dominant action a t i i ∈ A i then Ξ is nonempty because A i is a covering of A i and there exists X i ∈ A i such that a t i i ∈ X i . As considered in Theorem 2, if A i ∈ A i for all i ∈ N then Ξ is nonempty because A i contains every action. To summarize, we have the following lemma.
For the second step, let V : Ξ → R be such that
for all ξ ∈ Ξ and consider the set of its maximizers Ξ * = arg max ξ∈Ξ V (ξ).
where κ is a positive constant.
Proof. Let {ξ k ∈ Ξ} ∞ k=1 be such that
We regard {Q k } ∞ k=1 as a sequence of probability measures on a discrete metric space T × A. Note that, for every ε > 0, there exists a finite subset S ε ⊂ T such that
is tight because S ε × A is finite and thus compact. Accordingly, by Prohorov's theorem, 14 {Q k } ∞ k=1 has a weakly convergent subsequence
Therefore, ξ * ∈ Ξ * and thus Ξ * is nonempty.
, and F 00 = min X∈A F (X). Note that
14 See Billingsley (1968), for example.
We also have
Combining the above inequalities, we have
For the third step, let Ξ be partially ordered by the relation ⊆ such that ξ ⊆ ξ 0 for
Lemma 6 If Ξ * ⊆ Ξ is nonempty, then it contains at least one maximal element. If ξ * is a maximal element of Ξ * , then (u, P ) has a Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ * ∈ Σ such that σ * (t) ∈ ∆(A) assigns probability 1 to the action subspace ξ * (t) ∈ A for all t ∈ T , i.e., P a∈ξ * (t) σ * (a|t) = 1 for all t ∈ T .
Proof. If every linearly ordered subset of Ξ * has an upper bound in Ξ * , then Ξ * contains at least one maximal element by Zorn's Lemma. Let Ξ 0 ⊆ Ξ * be linearly ordered. Fix t = (t i ) i∈N ∈ T . For each i ∈ N , observe that
is linearly ordered by the set inclusion relation. Since this set is finite, it has a maximum element, which is equal to S
Since this set is linearly ordered and finite, it has a maximum element ξ (j,t) . Simply denote it by ξ hti , which satisfies
Since this set is linearly ordered and finite, it has a maximum element ξ hsi . Simply denote it by ξ ε , which satisfies ξ ε i (t i ) =
for all t i ∈ T i and i ∈ N. Note thatξ is an upper bound of Ξ 0 . Since ξ ε (t) =ξ(t) for t ∈ T with P (t) > ε, it must be true that
This implies that lim
and thusξ ∈ Ξ * , which completes the proof of the first half of the lemma.
We prove the second half. Let ξ * ∈ Ξ * be a maximal element. Let ξ * i ∈ Ξ i be such that ξ * (t) = Q i∈N ξ * i (t i ) for all t ∈ T and write ξ * −i (t −i ) =
We show that there exists a Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ * ∈ Σ * . Let
Note that β is the best response correspondence of (u, P ) restricted to Σ * .
We show that β has nonempty values. This is true if and only if, for all i ∈ N ,
Suppose that t i ∈ T i \T u i i . Then (3) is true because ξ * i (t i ) contains every undominated action of type t i .
Suppose that t i ∈ T u i i . Rewrite the left-hand side of (3) as
and ξ * i (t i ) is maximal in the argmax set where Λ
by the definition of generalized potential functions. To see that λ
where
Because σ −i ∈ Σ * −i and thus
and thus (5) . Therefore, (3) is true by (4) and (5).
We have shown that β has nonempty values. We can show that Σ * is compact 15 and convex and that β has a closed graph and convex values. By Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg fixed point theorem, β has a fixed point σ * ∈ Σ * , which is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of (u, P ).
We now report the fourth and final step. An immediate implication of the above lemmas is the following. If (u, P ) is canonical (the case considered in Theorem 1), or if A i ∈ A i for all i ∈ N (the case considered in Theorem 2), then (u, P ) has a Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ * ∈ Σ such that P a∈ξ * (t) σ * (a|t) = 1 for all t ∈ T and X a∈X * σ *
where ξ * is a maximal element of Ξ * . Thus, to complete the proof, it is enough to show that, for every δ > 0, there existsε > 0 such that, for all ε ≤ε and every ε-elaboration with a Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ * satisfying (6), there exists µ ∈ E X * such that max a∈A |µ(a) − σ * P (a)| ≤ δ. Seeking a contradiction, suppose otherwise. Then, for some δ > 0, there exists a sequence {(u k , P k )} ∞ k=1 such that:
• (u k , P k ) is an ε k -elaboration of g and ε k → 0 as k → ∞.
• (u k , P k ) has a Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ * k with P a∈X * σ * k P (a) ≥ 1 − ε k κ.
• max
we have µ ∈ E X * . This is a contradiction, which completes the proof of the theorems. 15 A strategy subspace Σ * is compact with the topology of weak convergence defined in {ρ σ ∈ ∆(T × A) | σ ∈ Σ * , ρ σ (t, a) = P (t)σ(a|t) for all (t, a) ∈ T × A}.
Unordered Domains
We restrict attention to the class of generalized potential functions such that domains are partitions of action spaces. Let P i ⊆ 2 A i \∅ be a partition of A i . We write P = { Q i∈N X i | X i ∈ P i for i ∈ N } and P −i = { Q j6 =i X j | X j ∈ P j for j 6 = i}, which are partitions of A and A −i , respectively. The partition element of P i containing a i ∈ A i is denoted by P i (a i ). Similarly, the partition element of P containing a and that of P −i containing a −i are denoted by P (a) and P −i (a −i ), respectively. We say that a function v : A → R is P-measurable if v(a) = v(a 0 ) for a, a 0 ∈ A with a 0 ∈ P (a).
for all X i ∈ P i and λ i ∈ ∆(A −i ) such that
A partition element X * ∈ P is a best-response potential maximizer (BRP-maximizer) if v(a * ) > v(a) for all a * ∈ X * and a 6 ∈ X * .
For example, consider the special case where P i is the finest partition, i.e., P i = {{a i }} a i ∈A i for all i ∈ N . Then, it is straightforward to see that a function v : A → R is a best-response potential function of g if and only if arg max
for all i ∈ N and λ i ∈ ∆(A −i ). 16 A best-response potential function v induces a generalized potential function. Let F : A → R be such that A = P and F (P (a)) = v(a) for all a ∈ A. Note that P-measurability of v implies that F is well defined. Since A −i is a partition of A −i ,
Thus, for Λ i ∈ ∆(A −i ) and
. This implies that, if
and thus
by the definition of best-response potential functions. Therefore, F : A → R is a generalized potential function. This proves Lemma 2 and immediately implies the following result by Theorem 1.
Proposition 1 If g has a best-response potential function v :
A → R with a BRPmaximizer X * , then E X * is nonempty and robust to canonical elaborations in g.
This proposition generalizes the result of Ui (2001), who showed that the action profile that uniquely maximizes a potential function is robust to canonical elaborations.
Ordered Domains
Let P i be a partition of A i such that P i is linearly ordered by the order relation ≤ i for i ∈ N . Let Z i and Z i be the smallest and the largest elements of P i , respectively. The corresponding product order relation over P is denoted by ≤ N , and that over P −i is denoted by ≤ −i , respectively. If P i (a i ) ≤ i Z i for a i ∈ A i and Z i ∈ P i , we simply write
and that a i ∈ X i is maximal in
Definition 7 Let X * ∈ P be given. A P-measurable function v : A → R with v(a * ) > v(a) for all a * ∈ X * and a 6 ∈ X * is a monotone potential function of g if, for all i ∈ N and λ i ∈ ∆(A −i ), there exists
, and symmetrically, there exists
A partition element X * ∈ P is called a monotone potential maximizer (MP-maximizer).
We restrict attention to a complete information game g satisfying strategic complementarities or a monotone potential function v satisfying strategic complementarities in the following sense.
Definition 8 A complete information game g satisfies strategic complementarities if,
A → R satisfies strategic complementarities if an identical interest game g with g i = v for all i ∈ N satisfies strategic complementarities.
Note that if the partition P i is the finest one, then the order relation ≤ i naturally induces an order relation over the action set A i and the above definition of strategic complementarities reduces to the standard one.
A monotone potential function v with an MP-maximizer X * induces a generalized potential function with a GP-maximizer X * if g or v satisfies strategic complementarities.
Let A be such that
and Z 0 , Z 00 ∈ P with Z 0 ≤ N Z 00 , we write
Then, we have
where V : P → R is such that V (P (a)) = v(a) for all a ∈ A, which is well defined by P-measurability of v. Note that F (X * ) > F (X) for all X ∈ A\{X * }. By showing that F is a generalized potential function, we claim the following result.
Proposition 2 Suppose that g has a monotone potential function v : A → R with an MP-maximizer X * . If g or v satisfies strategic complementarities, then E X * is nonempty and robust to all elaborations in g.
Proof. By Theorem 2, it is enough to show that F : A → R given above is a generalized potential function of g with a GP-maximizer X * .
and [Z * i , Z * * i ] is maximal in the argmax set ordered by the set inclusion relation. We prove that
for all λ i ∈ ∆ Λ i (A −i ).
First, we calculate
Thus, we have
for all Z −i ∈ P −i . We show that Γ 00 i first order stochastically dominates Γ i and Γ i first order stochastically dominates Γ 0 i . We say that Q −i ⊆ P −i is a decreasing subset of
The definition of the stochastic dominance relation says that Γ 00 i first order stochastically dominates Γ i if, for any decreasing subset
It is known that Γ 00 i first order stochastically dominates Γ i if and only if, for any increasing function 17 
We show (8) for two cases separately, X * −i 6 ∈ Q −i and
Therefore, Γ 00 i first order stochastically dominates Γ i . Symmetrically, we can show that Γ i first order stochastically dominates Γ 0 i . 17 We say that G i :
Using the stochastic dominance relation, we show that
[X * i , Z * * i ] ∩ arg max
which imply (7). For Z −i ∈ P −i , let λ
This implies that Z
is minimal in the argmax set. Let
be minimal in the argmax set and let
be maximal in the argmax sets, respectively. Since v is a monotone potential function, it must be true that (9) is true. Suppose that v satisfies strategic complementarities. By the similar discussion, for any
This implies that
P i (b 0 i ) ≤ i P i (b i ). Therefore, Z * i = P i (a 0 i ) ≤ i P i (b 0 i ) ≤ i P i (b i ) and thusx i ∈ A i with P i (x i ) < i P i (a 0 i ), X a −i ∈A −i λ i (a −i ) ¡ v(a 0 i , a −i ) − v(x i , a −i ) ¢ = X Z −i ∈P −i Γ i (Z −i ) X a −i ∈A −i λ Z −i i (a −i ) ¡ v(a 0 i , a −i ) − v(x i , a −i ) ¢ ≥ X Z −i ∈P −i Γ 0 i (Z −i ) X a −i ∈A −i λ Z −i i (a −i ) ¡ v(a 0 i , a −i ) − v(x i , a −i ) ¢ = X a −i ∈A −i λ 0 i (a −i ) ¡ v(a 0 i , a −i ) − v(x i , a −i ) ¢ > 0.
and thus (9) is true.
To summarize, if either g or v satisfies strategic complementarities, (9) is true. Similarly, we can show that (10) is true. Therefore, we obtain (7).
We can obtain the simpler form of the MP-maximizer condition if a complete information game satisfies diminishing marginal returns. We say that a complete information game satisfies diminishing marginal returns if every player's payoff function is concave with respect to his own action. Let Z + i ∈ P i be the smallest element larger than Z i 6 = Z i , and Z − i ∈ P i be the largest element smaller than Z i 6 = Z i .
Definition 9 A complete information game g satisfies diminishing marginal returns if, for each i ∈ N and a −i ∈ A −i ,
In the case of diminishing marginal returns, we will see that the MP-maximizer condition reduces to the following simpler condition.
Definition 10 Let X * ∈ P be given. A P-measurable function v : A → R with v(a * ) > v(a) for all a * ∈ X * and a 6 ∈ X * is a local potential function of g if, for each i ∈ N , a i ∈ Z i with Z i > i X * i , and a
and symmetrically, for each i ∈ N , a i ∈ Z i with Z i < i X * i , and a
A partition element X * ∈ P is called a local potential maximizer (LP-maximizer).
We show that if a complete information game satisfies diminishing marginal returns, then a local potential function is a monotone potential function, by which we claim the following result.
Proposition 3 Suppose that g has a local potential function v : A → R with an LPmaximizer X * . If g satisfies diminishing marginal returns, and if g or v satisfies strategic complementarities, then E X * is nonempty and robust to all elaborations in g.
Proof. By Proposition 2, it is enough to show that if g satisfies diminishing marginal
returns, then a local potential function v is a monotone potential function. Let
be maximal in the argmax set and let a i ∈ arg max
be minimal in the argmax set. We prove that
− exists, and it must be true that, for all
Since v is a local potential function,
Since g satisfies diminishing marginal returns, we must have X
Symmetrically, let a i ∈ arg max
be minimal in the argmax set and let a i ∈ arg max
be maximal in the argmax set. By the symmetric argument, we can prove that
Combining the above arguments, we conclude that a local potential function v is a monotone potential function.
Proposition 3 has an important implication in the special case where
} for all i ∈ N and an LP-maximizer is {a * }. Note that a complete information game satisfies diminishing marginal returns in the trivial sense. It is straightforward to see that a function v : A → R is a local potential function with an LP-maximizer {a * } if and only if
for a i 6 = a * i .
One can show that if g has a p-dominant equilibrium a * with P i∈N p i < 1, then g has a local potential function v of this type. Let p = (p i ) i∈N ∈ [0, 1] N . Kajii and Morris (1997a) defined a * ∈ A to be a p-dominant equilibrium of g if, for all i ∈ N and
for a i ∈ A i . Kajii and Morris (1997a) showed that a p-dominant equilibrium with P i∈N p i < 1 is robust to all elaborations. This is an immediate consequence of Proposition 3, the above discussion and the following lemma.
Lemma 7
If g has a p-dominant equilibrium a * with P i∈N p i < 1, then g has a local potential function v : A → R with an LP-maximizer {a * } such that
In addition, v satisfies strategic complementarities.
Proof. Note that v is P-measurable and v(a * ) > v(a) for a 6 = a * . Note also that
otherwise for a i 6 = a * i . Thus, v satisfies strategic complementarities. Suppose that λ i ∈ ∆(A −i ) satisfies (11). Then, for a i 6 = a * i , X
Because a * is a p-dominant equilibrium, (12) is true, which completes the proof.
Local potential functions have the following dual characterization, which is easier to apply in finding local potential functions. We use it when we discuss examples. The dual characterization translates the condition with respect to beliefs to the condition with respect to payoff differences. 18 Remember that, in weighted potential functions, the payoff difference condition (1) leads to the belief condition (2) . The following lemma provides the payoff difference condition corresponding to the belief condition in Definition 10. 18 See Morris and Ui (2002) for the duality argument between beliefs and payoff differences.
Lemma 8 Let X * ∈ P be given. A P-measurable function v : A → R with v(a * ) > v(a) for all a * ∈ X * and a 6 ∈ X * is a local potential function of g if and only if, for each
for all a −i ∈ A −i , and symmetrically, there exists µ i (a
Proof. Suppose that v satisfies the condition in the lemma. Then,
Thus, v satisfies the first half of the condition in Definition 10. By the symmetric argument, we can show that v also satisfies the second half. Therefore, v is a local potential function.
Suppose that v is a local potential function. To show that µ i (a − i , a i ) and µ i (a + i , a i ) exist, we use Farkas' Lemma. 19 Farkas' Lemma says that, for finite dimensional vectors a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a m ∈ R n , the following two conditions are equivalent.
• If (a 1 , y) , . . . , (a m , y) ≤ 0 for y ∈ R n , then (a 0 , y) ≤ 0.
• There exists x 1 , . . . , x m ≥ 0 such that x 1 a 1 + · · · + x m a m = a 0 . 19 See textbooks of convex analysis such as Rockafellar (1970) .
Since v is a local potential function, if X
To illustrate the condition, consider a unanimity game g such that 
show that the above condition implies that y i /µ i > z j /µ j for all i 6 = j. In other words,
{1} is an LP-maximizer only if there exists µ i > 0 for i ∈ N such that y i /µ i > z j /µ j for all i 6 = j. We show this when i = 1 and j = n. Let {a k ∈ A} n k=0 be such that, for each k, a k i = 1 if i > k and a k i = 2 if i ≤ k. Note that a 0 = 1 and a n = 2. We have
. . , n − 1}, −z n /µ n ≥ v(a n−1 ) − v(a n ).
Thus, y 1 /µ 1 − z n /µ n ≥ P Let N = {1, 2, 3}, y 1 = 6, y 2 = y 3 = 1, z 1 = z 2 = z 3 = 2. If {1} is an LP-maximizer, then it must be true that 1/µ 2 > 2/µ 3 and 1/µ 3 > 2/µ 2 , which implies that 1 > 4.
Thus, {1} is not an LP-maximizer. If {2} is an LP-maximizer, then it must be true that 2/µ 2 > 6/µ 1 and 2/µ 1 > 1/µ 2 , which implies that 4 > 6. Thus, {2} is not an LP-maximizer.
Example 2
For i ∈ N = {1, . . . , n}, let A i = {0, 1, 2} and P i = {{0, 1}, {2}} where P i is linearly is a local potential function and X * is an LP-maximizer. Thus, E X * is a robust set. By the discussion of Example 3.1 of Kajii and Morris (1997a) , E X * is not a singleton and any single correlated equilibrium in E X * is not robust. with strategic complementarities and diminishing marginal returns, using the LP-maximizer condition. For example, they show that a two player, three action, symmetric payoff game in that class always has an LP-maximizer and give an example of a two player, four action, symmetric payoff game with no LP-maximizer.
Concluding Remarks
This paper introduces generalized potential functions and provides sufficient conditions for the robustness of sets of equilibria. The special cases of the conditions unify the sufficient conditions for the robustness of equilibria provided by Kajii and Morris (1997a) and Ui (2001) .
There are several open questions concerning the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information. Our "potential" technique could help with investigating them. One of the basic questions is when robust equilibria are unique if they exist. Kajii and Morris (1997a) showed that a strictly p-dominant equilibrium with P i∈N p i < 1 is the unique robust equilibrium. We do not find examples of generic games with multiple robust equilibria. However, we do not yet conclude whether or not robust equilibria of generic games are unique if they exist. Using generalized potential functions, we can make examples of robust equilibria of various games, which could help with investigating the question. This paper is the first step in studying the robustness of sets of equilibria. Topics for the future work include the problem of how to identify minimal robust sets.
